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Abstract The study aims to evaluate the impact of board structure and ownership structure on bank risk taking behavior in developed and emerging countries. To fulfill this objective, the study used annual data of 100 large commercial
banks for the period 2006-2017 from twelve countries. Zscore is used as the main
proxy of bank risk taking behavior. Internal corporate governance is measured
by board size, board independence, CEO power, gender diversity, state ownership and foreign ownership. The study controls the issues of endogeneity by
applying a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) econometric approach. The main findings of the study indicate that banks having a greater
board size, a higher portion of independent non-executive directors, and a powerful CEO with chair role duality result in reducing the risk of bankruptcy that
helps in achieving greater levels of financial stability in the banking sector. However, banks with increased female directors, higher portion of foreign and state
ownership escalates the probability of insolvency risk.
Keywords Board structure, Ownership structure, Risk, GMM, Endogeneity

1 Introduction
Since the start of the 21st century, the accounting scandals of Adelphia, Enron, and WorldCom highlighted the issues of ethics and corporate governance
(CG). These scandals caught the attention of researchers and policymakers in
the field of CG (Darrat et al 2016). Moving further, the world has witnessed two
serious financial crises i.e. Global financial crisis (GFC) 2007-2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis (ESDS) 2010-2011 specifically in financial institutions.
Since the mid-1990s, most of the financial crises triggered in emerging markets
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have resulted in the financial turmoil of other economies around the world1 .
However, for the first time, the worlds most powerful and largest economy i.e.
the USA was the source of global financial turmoil (Ballester et al 2019). These
crises urged various governments around the world to intervene and stabilize
the whole financial system (Bouzgarrou et al 2018). After GFC, it was expected
that banks safeguard themselves for such future financial turbulence. However,
many banks performed poorly again in ESDS of 2010-2011 (Hoque et al 2015).
The most severe effects of both GFC and ESDS remained largely in the financial
sector of developed countries (Mollah and Liljeblom 2016). However, CG issues
are more prominent in emerging countries as they are made of weak institutions
(Adegbite 2015).
In addition to the above, there is consensus in the literature that weak CG
mechanisms and imprudent risk taking policies by bank executives are the main
causes of both GFC and ESDS (Hoque et al 2015; Vallascas et al 2017). Therefore, risk management becomes the primary agenda for policymakers since the
financial stability of banks is interlinked with the stability of the entire economy (Lassoued et al 2016). Consequently, regulators are continuously trying to
improve the quality of risk management mechanisms specifically in the banking
sector. Likewise, CG remains pivotal for predicting bankruptcy. However, the relationship between CG and a banks insolvency risk is not completely addressed
in the literature (Darrat et al 2016). Angeloni 2 makes an interesting claim by
arguing that governance is the first line of defense of a banks soundness, whereas
capital is the last one. Even when CG is not directly linked to any aspect of a
banks balance sheet, it may play a similar role to capital . Resultantly, most
corporate governance codes focus on internal CG aspects in managing firms risk
(Akbar et al 2017). Hence, CG may play an imperative role in shaping banks
risk taking policies.
Bearing in mind the significance of internal CG mechanism and bank risk
taking after the onset of both GFC and ESDS, it is imperative to analyze
the relationship between internal CG aspects, i.e. board structure and ownership structure against bank risk taking behavior in developed and emerging
economies. Previous studies in this aspect mostly focused on developed markets
specifically in European countries and the USA in the recent past (Akbar et al
2017; Anginer et al 2018; Apergis 2019; Berger et al 2016; Felı́cio et al 2018).
However, few studies focused on emerging markets in this context (Andrie et al
2018; Ghassan and Fachin 2016; Setiyono and Tarazi 2018).
The study used annual data of 100 large commercial banks for the period
2006-2017 from twelve countries. Zscore is used as the main proxy of the risk
taking behavior of banks. Internal CG is measured by board size, board independence, CEO power, gender diversity, state ownership and foreign ownership.
The main findings of the study indicate that banks having a greater board size,
1 For instance, the Mexican currency crisis of (1994-1995) disrupts the Mexican market and
then it spreads to worldwide markets. Furthermore, after one year, the Asian financial crisis
of (1997-1998) not only resulted in the default of Russia but also has a devastating effect on
Asian economies. Likewise, the phenomenon is observed in subsequent crises of Brazil 1999,
Turkey 2001, and Argentina 2002 (Ballester et al 2019)
2 Ignazio Angeloni is the member of the supervisory board of the European Central Bank.
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a higher portion of independent non-executive directors, and a powerful CEO
with chair role duality reduces the risk of bankruptcy that helps in achieving
greater levels of financial stability in the banking sector. However, for banks
with increased female directors, the higher portion of foreign and state ownership escalates the probability of insolvency risk. The structure of the paper is
as follows: The first part of the study is the introduction and relevant literature
is described in section two. Section three elaborates the data description and
methodology. Results and analysis are given in section four. The last section
includes the conclusion, recommendations, and policy implications.

2 Literature review
2.1 Board size (BS) and risk taking behavior of banks
Leadership structure, composition of the board, and the size of board members
are vital features affecting the efficacy of the entire board (Jensen 1993). According to the strands of agency theory, small boards can easily be handled by
the CEO because of social cohesion. It also takes less time and effort on part
of the CEO to take any action. On the contrary, a large board would require
more effort and time to decide and take approval on a key decision (Muth and
Donaldson 1998). Therefore, firms with large boards curtail CEOs power in
strategic decision making process. However, stewardship theory states that a
small board size can easily reach a consensus related to any important matter
because a smaller group of people is more socially cohesive. In contrast, firms
with large boards may face communication problems. In addition, large boards
may result in increased group conflicts because every individual might present
his perspective while deciding any matter of interest (O’Reilly III et al 1989).
Hence, a larger board might find it difficult to agree especially when firms require to make complex and ambiguous decisions (Muth and Donaldson 1998).
The results are inconclusive in past literature; for instance, the findings of
(Eisenberg et al 1998) imply that firms with large BS are made of outside directors who are more concerned about their reputation in the case of insolvency
instead of being concerned about the private benefits associated with portable
projects. In the case of the US, Pathan (2009) confirmed that banks with small
boards pursue the interest of management that results in increased risk taking
behavior by bank executives. Similarly, Wang (2012) revealed that firms tend
to invest more in risky projects when they have small boards as compared to
firms that possess larger boards. In addition, BS is inversely associated with
credit risk levels of the UK banking sector (Lu and Boateng 2018). The results
demonstrated that large boards help in decreasing bankruptcy risk. Likewise,
in the case of China, the negative association between BS and credit risk is
also confirmed by the Haider and Fang (2016) findings. On the contrary, in
the case of Thailand, banks with smaller BS are more useful in evaluating and
monitoring bank managers, whereas, banks with larger BS are more exposed to
agency-related problems Pathan et al (2007). Interestingly, Akbar et al (2017)
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revealed that risk attached to financial firms of the UK is not statistically significant in relation to the size of their boards. Hence, based on previous literature
and following the theoretical arguments of agency theory, we, therefore, make
our first hypothesis:

H1 : BS and bank risk taking behavior are inversely related to each other in
developed and emerging economies

2.2 Board independence (BI) and risk taking behavior of banks
The behavior of managers remains opportunistic as discussed in agency theory. They want to attain perks and privileges at the expense of shareholders
money. This opportunistic behavior can only be eliminated when CEO does not
possess dual role because not only does that compromise the credibility of the
entire board, but also marginalizes shareholders interest. Moreover, managers
contribute to agency loss when CEO holds the dual role (Donaldson and Davis
1991).
The theoretical debate about board independence revolves around the role
of inside and outside directors. According to stewardship theory, inside directors
who spend a large amount of time within an organization possess more technical
expertise and higher information about the operations of a firm. Hence, these
notable qualities make them better suited for the job of protecting shareholders’
interest as compared to outside directors (Donaldson and Davis 1991. On the
other hand, under the employment and reputation hypothesis of agency theory, independent (outside) directors are better at monitoring management as
they are concerned about their professional image in the labor market. Therefore, they would ratify less risky investments to avoid huge losses (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Fama 1980). Similarly, outside directors are considered to be a
resource for the company because they possess excessive managerial experience,
skills, knowledge, qualification, and tenure as compared to inside directors. As a
result, they can add value to the firm and give valuable suggestions in strategic
decisions of a firm (Rashid 2015).
Recent evidence supporting the claims of agency and resource dependency
theory is presented by Akbar et al (2017). Their results largely imply that as
firms increase board independence, it will reduce the probability of bankruptcy.
In the case of the US, Pathan et al (2007) also finds identical results as board
independence and risk maintained an inverse association among different measures of risk. Furthermore, it is noted that board independence not only reduces
the risk of bankruptcy, but it also helps large banks to attain better performance
in the aftermath of GFC (Vallascas et al 2017). In addition, firms experience
better performance when they hire more independent non-executive directors
on their respective boards (Pathan et al 2007). Based on the above discussion
and following the theoretical arguments of agency theory we, make our second
hypothesis:
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H2 : BI and bank risk taking behavior are inversely related to each other in
developed and emerging economies
2.3 CEO power (CEOP) and risk taking behavior of banks
The behavior of managers remains opportunistic as discussed in agency theory. They want to attain perks and privileges at the expense of shareholders
money. This opportunistic behavior can only be eliminated when CEO does not
possess dual role because not only does that compromise the credibility of the
entire board, but also marginalizes shareholders interest. Moreover, in such a
situation, managers contribute to agency loss (Donaldson and Davis 1991). On
the contrary, the advocates of stewardship theory believe that managers do not
pursue individualistic behavior. Instead, they want self-recognition from their
bosses and peers, and carry out challenging task while exercising authority and
responsibility (Donaldson and Davis 1991).
According to stewardship theory, the presence of an effective structural environment in an organization determines managerial performance. Specifically,
when the role the of CEO is unchallenged and unambiguous in an organization,
the common notion is that such an organization structure enables higher management to achieve superior performance. By conforming to this role, the lower
level management is clear as to whom they are questionable in any matter in
an organization. Moreover, by pursuing such an organizational structure, a firm
can avail benefits of strong unity, control, and command (Donaldson and Davis
1991).
Although the term CEO Power is defined differently in literature, previous studies such as Fracassi and Tate (2012) revealed that when CEO has the ultimate
power, it helps the CEO to develop closer ties with the board of directors that
lowers bank profit margins. Furthermore, (Baklouti et al 2016) examined the
financial distress of 147 European banks. The findings demonstrated that banks
in which the CEO does not hold the dual role have better supervision capacity
and more powerful boards at their disposal. Likewise, it is revealed that the
likelihood of bankruptcy becomes higher for firms where the CEO performs the
dual role (Darrat et al 2016). Nevertheless, under the employment and reputation hypothesis, managers are risk aversea finding supported by previous
studies(Berger et al 2016; Pathan 2009). We follow the theoretical arguments of
agency theory and make our third hypothesis:
H3 : CEO Power and bank risk taking behavior are positively related to each
other in developed and emerging economies
2.4 Gender diversity (GD) and risk taking behavior of banks
The theoretical aspects of board GD are linked to ethical theory. A major part
of ethical theory is derived from gender social theory. It argues that men and
women used to think differently when making a decision. Men are mostly goaloriented and aggressive while women have a more nurturing attitude (Eagly and
Business Review: (2021) 16(2):21-43
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Wood 1999). Hence, ethical issues are evaluated differently by men and women
(Galbraith and Stephenson 1993). A study conducted by Peterson et al (1991)
regarding business ethics issues revealed that females tend to be more ethical
as compared to male students. In terms of accounting and finance literature,
it is noted that unethical behavior may bring potential risks for companies.
Therefore, risk management and ethical behavior cannot be separated from one
another (Drennan 2004). Moreover, firms tend to use ethical behavior as a risk
instrument, thereby adopting legal and ethical governance mechanism to reduce
their risk appetite (Arjoon 2005).
Over the years, women made great advances in every field of life. Therefore,
we witness an increase of women in management roles of firms around the
world (Hillman et al 2007; Melero 2011). A high record of female CEOs i.e.
21 is present among Fortune 500 companies. However, despite this increasing
trend, the number of women in management roles are considerably lower as
compared to men. Thus, all these discussions make gender a notable topic among
researchers and policymakers3 (Hillman et al 2007). In line with arguments of
ethical theory, Farag and Mallin (2017) revealed that when females are present
on bank boards, they are less exposed to a financial crisis. In addition, increased
GD does help banks to maximize their financial performance, as they provide
firms with unique resources. Similarly, De Cabo et al (2012) in case European
banks found that financial firms take less risk as the portion of female directors
are increased on their respective boards.
H4 : GD and bank risk taking behavior are inversely related to each other in
developed and emerging economies

2.5 Foreign ownership (FO) and risk taking behavior of banks
Berger et al (2000) explained the theoretical aspects of FO in two opposing hypotheses i.e. home field (HF) and global advantage (GA). HF hypothesis claims
that foreign-owned banks are usually less effective and efficient. This is because
they use to operate and monitor their respective institutes from distance and
may face barriers in language, culture, and other market related supervisory
structures in host countries. However, the GA hypothesis posits that banks
with high FO possess greater resources, knowledge, expertise, and skills that
enable them to better diversify their potential risk and generate higher returns.
In line with the GA hypothesis, Lassoued et al (2016) examined 171 commercial banks in the MENA region and finds an inverse association between
FO and insolvency risk. The result can be attributed towards better monitoring and evaluation of overall risk related activities by foreign entities. Similarly,
after analyzing a large sample of 322 banks from European Union, Lapteacru
(2019) finds that banks with increased FO are successful in taking the global
advantage of better technical expertise, excellent management skills, the use
3 The EU commission, (2012) has agreed to the proposal presented by European parliament
that recommends to increase the gender quota to 40 percent in large scale enterprises as their
non-executive directors till January 1st, 2020 (Szydlo 2015).
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of latest technologies, and portfolio diversification of their assets in the host
country. Hence, they are better capable to limit their excessive risk taking behavior. In addition, it is noted that foreign owned firms use to take less risk
as they are more prudent in their risk evaluation matters (Vo 2016). Nevertheless, few studies that support the notion of HF hypothesis and finds that
foreign owned banks have higher chances of bankruptcy as compared to domestic banks(Boubakri et al 2013; Caporale et al 2017). Based on above discussion
and following the theoretical arguments of the GA hypothesis we, therefore,
make our fifth hypothesis:
H5 : FO and bank risk taking behavior are inversely related to each other in
developed and emerging economies

2.6 State ownership (SO) and risk raking behavior of banks
Most countries are comprised of two-tier banking ownership structures i.e. private or public4 (Zhu and Yang 2016). A general assumption is that banks with
high SO are usually inefficient. Two different theoretical aspects may explain
the intervention of states in financial markets. The first one is related to Kindleberger (1963) who believes that state intervention in financial markets is necessary for economic sustainability in a country. He relates this view with an
optimistic or more developmental view. However, the other view is based more
on achieving political objectives instead of social development objectives. The
political objectives of politicians led them to control investment by firms. They
may compensate their voters in the form of giving them jobs, subsidies, and
other perks and privileges, so that they have a higher chance of forming a government in the next term (La Porta et al 2002).
In line with assumptions of political theories, Lapteacru (2019) examined 644
state owned banks and 1939 foreign banks in central and eastern Europe. He
found that banks with increased SO are riskier as compared to their foreign
counterparts. Further, the policies pursued by state-owned banks in the selected sample make those banks as worst capitalized as compared to private
banks. In the case of Zhu and Yang (2016) found a positive effect of SO on a
banks credit risk after using different measures of bank risk taking behavior.
The results imply that banks with SO are encouraged to take on more risk as
they are being backed by their respective governments. Likewise, such banks are
also found to be less prudent in their lending practices as compared to foreign
banks that makes them riskier (Dong et al 2014). However, despite all these
discussions, few studies that are in line with assumptions of development theories reveals that SO decreases the probability of bankruptcy across different
economies e.g. (Iannotta et al 2013; Boubakri et al 2013). Based on empirical
evidence of past studies and following the arguments of political theories we,
make our sixth hypothesis:
4 As a matter of fact, almost 21 percent of worlds banking industry is under state ownership
(Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli 2013)
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H6 : SO and bank risk taking behavior are positively related to each other in
developed and emerging economies

3 Research methodology
3.1 Data description and sample selection
The primary objective of this study is to analyze the impact of internal CG
aspects on bank risk taking behavior in developed and emerging economies.
Data for firm-related variables are extracted from thebankerdatabase. Data for
CG-related variables are extracted from the BoardEx 5 database and Thomson
ONE Banker database. Moreover, we used World Development Indicators (WDI)
to collect macroeconomic data. Following Andrie et al (2018), we collect the data
of 100 large banks for the period 2006-2017 from twelve6 countries. The banks
are classified according to asset size in the study. It is noted that large banks
are pivotal for achieving financial stability in a country (Vallascas et al 2017).
To include a bank in our sample, we adopt two different criteria. First, we only
select those banks that are not delisted after GFC because their data may not
be available during the time of ESDS (Mollah and Liljeblom 2016). Second, we
eliminated banks whose data is not available for a consecutive period of five
years; otherwise, we may not apply the generalized method of moments as our
main estimation method (Florackis and Ozkan 2009; Akbar et al 2017). After
applying both these criteria, we end up with 1200 annual firm year observations.
The quoted number of banks in selected countries is a representation of more
than 60% of total banking assets7 –a representation similar to (Erkens et al
(2012). Despite a relatively small sample size, this sample size is similar to
previous cross-country studies (De Andres and Vallelado 2008).Furthermore, the
study includes 16 systemically important banks out of 29 global systemically
important financial institutions mentioned by Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) in
their study.

3.2 Variable description
We use the accounting-based measure of bank risk taking behavior in this study
i.e. Zscore (ZS), a widely used indicator of default risk and risk taking (Vallascas et al 2017; Ghassan and Fachin 2016). For robustness purposes, we use
non-performing loans (NPL) as a proxy for bank risk taking (Lu and Boateng
5 In case of Pakistan, data for CG variables are collected by authors from annual reports.
As Boardex database dont have the availability of such data related to Pakistan.
6 Developed economies include USA, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the UK, and emerging economies are China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan. According to
World Bank, more than 50% of these countries for e.g. (USA, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, India and Italy) are included in world top 10 economies at the end of year 2018.
The detailed distribution of sample is provided in Appendix A1 and A2
7 At the end of year 2006, among the selected banks, USA represent 59%, UK 76%, Thailand
84%, Spain 55%, Pakistan 95%, Malaysia 55%, Indonesia 71%, India 56%, France 68%, China
75% and Germany 26% respectively
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2018). The board structure variables following Apergis (2019); Setiyono and
Tarazi (2018); Mollah and Liljeblom (2016); Akbar et al (2017); Adams et al
(2005) are BS8 , BI, CEOP, and GD. In contrast, ownership structure variables following Lapteacru (2019); Bouzgarrou et al (2018); Caporale et al (2017)
and Boubakri et al (2013). Apart from these variables, we control for firm size
(FS)(Konishi and Yasuda 2004). Following Uhde (2016), we also control leverage
(LEV) ratio9 because it is pivotal for banks to maintain an appropriate capital
structure. In addition, gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (INF) are
also used as control variables.According to Lassoued et al (2016), development
of a country does affect the performance of banks. The INF rate determines how
banks behave and affect both their assets and liabilities. Lastly, by following the
methodology of Pathan et al (2007), we include the crisis dummy variable for
both GFC and ESDS for the years 2007-2011. For the detailed formulation of
proxies, see table 1.

3.3 Estimation method
The data signals both cross-sectional (multiple banks) and longitudinal (multiple years) characteristics. The bank risk heterogeneity may result in biased
estimation. Therefore, to remove such concerns, we need to apply a special estimation technique (Ben Jabra et al 2017). It is necessary because explanatory
variables are correlated with a lag dependent variable that makes OLS estimates
biased. In addition, explanatory variables are also expected to be correlated with
error terms especially when such variables are endogenous that makes such results more biased (Akbar et al 2017). All these econometric problems can be
fixed by the application of two-step GMM. It corrects the aforementioned bias
and also eliminates the issue of fixed effects by a first-differences transformation
(Arellano and Bond 1991). Therefore, in the presence of endogeneity, using twostep GMM is considered more useful as compared to OLS or fixed effects.Hence,
by following the works of Wintoki et al (2012); Zhou et al (2014) and Akbar
et al (2017) we employ two-step GMM econometric model.

3.4 Estimation model
We use the following baseline models to examine the effect of board structure
and ownership structure against bank risk taking behavior in developed and
developing countries.
ZS,N P Lit = β0 + β1 ZS,N P Lit +

4
X

(board structure)itj +

β3

2
X

(ownership structure)itj

β4

+ β5 (control)itj + β6 (crisis)itj + θχitj + µi,j + eitj
(1)
8
9

Following Akbar et al (2017)we take natural log of board size
We have taken natural log of leverage ratio to remove the issue of outliers.

Business Review: (2021) 16(2):21-43

Published by iRepository, February 2022

29

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol16/iss2/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1405

G.Subhani and S.Zeb
Table 1: Variable Formulation
Variables
Dependant
Variables
ZS

NPL

Independent
Variables
BS

BI

CEOP

GD
FO
SO
Control
Variables
LEV
FS
GDP
INF
Crisis

Description

Related Literature

Source

Average ROA+
Capital to Asset Ratio
Divided by Standard
Deviation of ROA
Gross non-performing
loans/Gross
Total
Loans

Vallascas et al (2017)

Author’s
calculation
based on the banker’s
database

Lu and Boateng (2018)

thebankerdatabase

Natural Log of total
number of board members
Percentage of independent
directors on board
CEO’s chair role duality
equals 1 and 0 otherwise
Percentage of female
directors on board
Percentage of Equity
held by Foreign owners
Percentage of Equity
held by state

Apergis (2019),
Akbar et al (2017)

BoardEx

Setiyono and Tarazi (2018)

BoardEx

Adams and Ferreira (2007)

BoardEx

Abad et al (2017)

BoardEx

Lassoued et al (2016)

Thompson One Banker

Lapteacru (2019)

Thompson One Banker

Natural log of Total
Debt/Total Equity
Natural log of Total
Assets
Real GDP Growth
Rate
Growth of CPI

Uhde (2016)

thebankerdatabase

Konishi and Yasuda (2004)

thebankerdatabase

Lassoued et al (2016)

World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators
thebankerdatabase

Crisis equals 1 if the
year is
2007-2011 and zero
otherwise

Lassoued et al (2016)
Pathan and Faff (2013)

ZS,N P Lit = α0 + α1 ZS,N P Lit + α2 (controls)itj + θχitj + µi,j + eitj

(2)

In the above equations the left hand side variables i.e. ZS,N P Lit are the
dependent variables used in the study. The right hand side variables include
BoardStructureitj ,OwnershipStructureitj , and controlitj . In addition, χitj represents the exogenous variable i.e. crisis dummy, µij denotes unobserved firm
effects and eitj stands for the residuals. For more information, please see Table
1.
30
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4 Results and discussions
4.1 Summary Statistics

Table 2: Results of Summary Statistics for Banks of Developed Countries
Variables

Mean

Max.

Min.

Std.
Dev.

Count

BS
BI
CEOP
GD
FO
SO
LEV
FS
GDP
INF
ZS
NPL

12.7
0.56
0.54
0.13
0.02
0.02
6.98
12.01
1.21
1.82
13.96
3.38

37
0.93
1.00
0.55
0.25
0.73
11.1
15.15
4.17
10.13
45.57
22.84

2.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.17
2.21
-5.61
-0.5
-0.77
0.11

4.82
0.29
0.50
0.11
0.05
0.10
0.45
1.87
1.91
1.23
7.81
3.19

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600

Table 2 exhibits the summary statistics for banks in developed countries.
The average BS of banks in developed countries is 12.70. Maximum number
of directors on board is 37 and minimum number of directors on board is 2
with a standard deviation of 4.82 which implies the dispersion among the total
number of members on board for banks in developed countries. BI remains at 56
percent for banks in developed countries. Likewise, almost 54 percent of banks
have a powerful CEOP. However, the mean value for GD is 0.13. It indicates that
females are working in male-dominated environments as the board of directors.
The mean value for FO and SO remains identical at 0.02. Maximum FO and
SO is 0.25 and 0.73 respectively. The mean value of LEV ratio implies that
banks are highly leveraged. The mean value of FS is 12.01. The mean value
for macroeconomic variables is 1.21 and 1.82 for GDP and INF respectively.
Average ZS and NPL values for banks in developed countries remain at 13.96
and 3.38 respectively.
Table 3 exhibits the summary statistics for banks in emerging countries.
The mean value of bank BS in emerging countries is 10.94 almost 2 percent
less than developed countries i.e. 12.70. According to Jensen (1993), the ideal
board size comprises of 7 members. Maximum number of directors on board is
25 and minimum number of directors on board is 4 with a standard deviation
of 3.51. In comparison to 56 percent BI in developed countries, the banks in
emerging countries have only 39 independent boards. However, the mean value
of CEOP is 0.59 as compared to 0.54 in developed countries. The mean value of
GD is 0.09. It implies that similar to developed countries, females in emerging
countries are also working in male dominated environments as the board of directors. The mean value for FO and SO is 0.04 and 0.18. The banks in emerging
countries have higher FO and SO as compared to banks in developed countries.
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Table 3: Results of Summary Statistics for Banks of Emerging Countries
Variables

Mean

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

Count

BS
BI
CEOP
GD
FO
SO
LEV
FS
GDP
INF
ZS
NPL

10.94
0.39
0.59
0.09
0.04
0.18
7.01
10.6
5.86
4.66
21.68
4.66

25
0.93
1.00
0.50
0.63
0.99
9.65
15.2
14.23
53.38
73.26
53.38

4
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-6.33
5.99
-1.51
0.27
-2.29
0.27

3.51
0.25
0.49
0.11
0.10
0.29
0.70
1.91
2.86
5.84
12.48
5.84

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600

Maximum FO and SO are 0.63 and 0.99 respectively. The mean value of the
LEV ratio is 10.60, which indicates that banks are highly leveraged similar to
banks in developed countries. The mean value of FS is 10.60. In addition, the
mean value for macroeconomic variables is 5.86 and 4.66 for GDP and INF respectively. The average ZS and NPL for banks in developed countries are 21.68
and 4.66 respectively.

4.2 Regression results
Table 4 reports results of ordinary least square (OLS) fixed effects because the
p-values of the Hausman test reject the random effects null hypothesis among
all three models. However, it is noted that OLS results are biased and invalid
because OLS econometric approach suffers from endogeneity problems (Apergis 2019. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that board structure analysis suffers
from endogeneity problems and it is one of the key concerns that need to be
addressed in corporate governance studies (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). In
such circumstances, the results from OLS estimated model are deemed to be
biased and inconsistent. However, despite the biasness of the OLS estimated
model, it is necessary to run such a model before adopting an instrumental type
of methodology such as GMM to know the difference of results between these
econometric models. Hence, by following Apergis (2019) this study used OLS
econometric approach before implementing the GMM approach.
The findings in Table 5 demonstrated that BS is inversely associated with
bank risk taking behavior. This implies that as the board grows in size, it helps
the bank to reduce its overall risk appetite. The result supports the findings
of Eisenberg et al (1998) who stated that large BS mostly consists of outside
directors who are concerned about their public image/reputation. As a result,
they ratify less risky investments. Similar results are found by (Haider and Fang
2016). Based on our findings related to BS in table 5, we accept our proposed
H1. The results remained identical in developed countries contexts. On the
contrary, BS remained positively associated with bank risk taking in emerging
countries but such association is not significant. The reason is evident in table
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Table 4: OLS results for Overall, Developed, and Emerging Countries
Variables

BS
BI
CEOP
GD
FO
SO
LEV
FS
Crisis
R-square
No of Obs

Overall
tries

Coun-

-0.995***
-0.006
-0.804*
-0.082
0.119
-0.648
0.712
-0.521
3.011
-0.104
3.714***
-0.003
-3.139***
0.000
-0.063
-0.751
-1.722***
0.000
0.241
1200

Developed
Countries

Emerging Countries

-0.643**
-0.025
-0.611
-0.119
-0.018
-0.937
2.151**
-0.027
0.833
-0.748
4.759***
-0.008
-6.522***
0.000
-2.614***
0.000
-0.855***
0.000
0.314
600

-2.122**
-0.011
-1.487
-0.112
-0.481
-0.347
-1.101
-0.606
3.967
-0.115
2.761
-0.104
-3.044***
0.000
1.302***
0.000
-1.782***
0.000
0.302
600

Table 4 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects results from predicting
default risk proxied by Zscore. The estimates in the first column report full sample
results. P-values are mentioned below their coefficient estimates, ***, **, * presents
significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

3 where the average board size is approximately 10.94 for emerging countries.
However, the ideal board size is seven members; if it exceeds this number, there
may be communication/coordination constrains that hurts the effectiveness of
entire board (Jensen 1993). Identical findings are reported by (Akbar et al 2017;
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn 2011).
Furthermore, BI is also inversely associated with bank risk taking behavior
in the overall sample and emerging countries. Therefore, we accept our proposed
H2. The result implies that under the employment and reputation hypothesis,
independent outside directors are better at reducing agency conflicts. Following resource dependency theory, outside directors have excessive managerial
experience, skills, knowledge, qualification, and tenure in comparison to inside
directors (Muth and Donaldson 1998). In addition, outside directors like to keep
a better professional image in the labor market, thus they are reluctant to approve risky investments that helps bank to achieve higher financial stability by
avoiding huge losses (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Similar empirical
evidence is presented by previous studies (Pathan et al 2007; Vallascas et al
2017). However, in case of developed countries, BI maintained a positive but insignificant association with bank risk taking behavior. This positive association
is found in previous studies as well (Fama and Jensen 1983; Pirson and Turnbull
2011; Sá et al 2017). The result implies that independent non-executive directors lack relevant information in comparison to inside directors, making them
less effective in resolving agency conflicts and monitoring management.
The result of CEO chair role duality is negatively linked to bank risk taking
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Table 5: GMM results for overall, developed and emerging countries
Variables

ZS-1
ZS-2
BS
BI
CEOP
GD
FO
SO
LEV
FS
Crisis
AR2
Hansen/Sargan
No of Observations

Overall
Countries

Developed
Countries

Emerging Countries

0.772***
0.000

0.712***
0.000

0.629***
0.000
0.274***
0.000
0.355
-0.116
-2.569***
-0.001
-0.04
-0.91
2.986***
0.000
9.666***
0.000
1.236*
-0.055
-2.541***
0.000
0.824***
0.000
-0.031
-0.837
0.136
0.996
500

-0.341**
-0.037
-0.945***
0.000
-0.229**
-0.037
0.846*
-0.098
4.725***
0.000
2.503***
0.000
-2.774***
0.000
-0.186***
-0.008
-0.588***
0.000
0.556
0.184
1100

-0.731**
-0.014
0.001
-0.996
-0.236**
-0.013
-1.125
-0.274
-11.487**
-0.027
0.26
-0.933
-1.146***
0.000
0.478***
0.000
-0.241**
-0.014
0.748
0.989
550

Note: Table 5 reports the results of two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates
using ZS as a proxy of bank risk taking behavior for banks. The p-values of AR-2 correlation
show that there is no issue of serial correlation in all models. According to Hansen test of over
identification, all instruments are valid. P-values are mentioned in brackets below the coefficient
estimates. ***, **, * presents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In terms of
the endogeneity test, the p-values of Hausman test reject the random effects null hypothesis
among all three models in favor of GMM models .

behavior in all three models. It leads us to reject our proposed H3. The result implies that managers are concerned about their public image in the labor market
and therefore, disapprove risky investments. Moreover, high risk taking policies
pursued by bank executives might lead the bank towards default risk that could
deteriorate CEO’s reputation. In this way, a powerful CEO who possesses chair
role duality helps bank to decrease their overall risk appetite. The results are in
line with other studies(Berger et al 2016; Pathan 2009). In addition, the results
of GD remained positively linked to bank risk taking in overall and emerging
countries contexts. Based on such empirical evidence we reject our proposed
H4. The findings suggest that increasing female portion as the board of directors results in instability of financial institutes. These results are inconsistent
with the previous study such as De Andres and Vallelado (2008) but are similar
Berger et al (2014) as they claim that increasing the number of women in the
board of directors does not decrease the risk taking behavior of the German
banking sector. Likewise, Adams and Funk (2012)also find that Swedish female
supervisors are not more risk-averse than their male counterparts when they
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work in male-dominated environments. This is evident as reported in Tables 2
and 3, which show that only 11 percent of females are working as the board of
directors in the selected sample. However, this association remains negative but
insignificant in the case of developed countries which is similar to the findings
of Sila et al (2016).
In terms of ownership structure, FO is positively linked to banks risk taking
in overall and emerging countries contexts. Based on this result, we reject our
proposed H5. These findings imply that banks with higher levels of FO are more
susceptible to insolvency risk that may destabilize the financial sector. This empirical evidence supports the notion of the HF hypothesis (Berger et al 2000),
whereby foreign entities are at disadvantage because of lower profit margins and
the high cost of providing similar services in comparison to state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the barriers of culture, language, and supervisory structures
make it difficult for foreign entities to outperform domestic banks. Similar results are reported by studies (Boubakri et al 2013; Caporale et al 2017; Lee and
Hsieh 2014). On the contrary, FO is inversely associated with banks probability
of default in developed countries. This result is in line with Lapteacru (2019).
He found that foreign-owned entities have better risk management skills, resources, and policies that enable them to outperform state-owned enterprises.
This inverse association supports the viewpoints of the GA hypothesis Berger
et al (2000). The results also indicate that SO is positively linked to the risk
taking behavior of banksin all three models. However, this association is not significant for developed countries. Based on empirical evidence reported in table 5
we accept our proposed H6. This result is similar to previous studies (Dong et al
2014; Lapteacru 2019; Zhu and Yang 2016). The results imply that state-owned
bank representatives used to engage in risky investments as they are backed by
the government. This makes them exposed to the risk of insolvency that may
hurt the stability of the whole financial sector. In terms of control variables,
LEV remains inversely associated with the risk taking behavior of banks in all
three models. It implies that when banks tend to finance more through debt, it
results in reducing the risk taking behavior of banks. This result contradicts the
findings of Campbell and Mı́nguez-Vera (2008). They found that the probability
of bankruptcy increased when firms take on excessive debt. However, according to Jensen (1993), higher debt may be used as an instrument to eliminate
agency costs when managers tend to waste-free cash flows. In this way, firms can
align the interest of principals and agents that ultimately reduce their chance
of bankruptcy.
In addition, the results of FS maintained an inverse association with bank
risk taking in the overall sample. The result suggests that as banks grow in
size, they are more capable of diversifying their investment activities which enables them to achieve higher levels of stability(Anginer et al 2018). This is in
line with the findings of Bebczuk and Galindo (2008). However, this association
remained positive in subsamples of developed and emerging countries, implying that if large firms know they are too big to fail, they may pursue riskier
strategies, as large banks are expected to benefit from government bailouts and
insurance schemes in comparison to small banks (Anginer et al 2018. Lastly,
findings of crisis dummy revealed that large banks–due to their better diversifi-
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cation strategies–are not prone to insolvency risk during both GFC and ESDC.

Table 6: Robustness Test using Alternative Measure of Bank Risk Taking Behavior
Variables

NPL-1
NPL-2
BS
BI
CEOP
GD
FO
SO
LEV
FS
Crisis
AR2
Hansen/Sargan
No of Observations

Overall
Countries

Developed
Countries

Emerging
Countries

0.814***
0.000

0.781***
0.000

-0.184**
-0.011
1.634***
0.000
0.410***
0.000
-0.627***
-0.002
7.715***
0.000
0.582***
0.000
0.730***
0.000
0.070**
-0.079
-0.094***
0.000
0.334
0.195

0.923***
0.000
-0.204***
0.000
0.474***
0.000
1.251***
0.000
0.981***
0.000
-1.661***
0.000
7.783***
0.000
-9.882***
0.000
1.371***
0.000
0.572***
0.000
0.145***
0.000
0.184
0.951

-0.644***
0.000
3.301***
0.000
-0.538***
0.000
1.418***
-0.003
6.094***
0.000
1.754***
0.000
0.543***
0.000
-0.793***
0.000
-0.869***
0.000
0.301
0.984

1100

500

550

-

-

Table 6 reports the results of two-step GMM estimates using NPL as a proxy
of default risk for banks. The pvalues of the AR-2 correlation show that
there is no issue of serial correlation in all models. According to Hansen’s
test of over-identification, all instruments are valid. P-values are mentioned
in brackets below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * presents significance
level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Table 6 reports the results of internal CG and bank risk taking behavior using
alternate proxy i.e. NPL. The results largely remain identical to our findings
presented in table 5. However, the results of LEV in all three models using NPL
as a measure of bank risk taking is opposite to the results in table 5. Banks
often use high debt to escalate their business growth and it is also used as an
instrument to eliminate agency cost when managers tend to waste-free cash
flows. However, excessive debt beyond a threshold may increase the chances of
bankruptcy. Excessive debt taking might signal investors that the firm is not
able to generate positive cash flows on its own, which may hurt the reputation
of that respective firm. This result is likewise to the findings of Campbell and
Mı́nguez-Vera (2008). They found that the probability of bankruptcy increased
when firms take on excessive debt. The difference in results are mainly attributed
to the economic conditions of different countries and formulations of bank risk
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taking behavior proxies as mentioned in table 1.

Table 7: Macroeconomic Variables and Bank Risk Taking Behavior
ZS Results
Variables

GDP
INF
AR2
Hansen/
Sargan
No of Obs

NPL Results
Overall
Countries

Developed
Countries

Emerging
Countries

Overall
Countries

Developed
Countries

Emerging
Countries

-0.189***
0.000
0.077***
0.000
0.216
0.07

-0.016
-0.907
-0.05
-0.837
0.273
0.994

0.079
-0.003
0.051
-0.13
0.457
0.989

-0.141***
0.000
0.048***
0.000
0.306
0.05

-0.756***
0.000
-0.086***
0.000
0.815
0.961

-0.124***
0.000
0.116***
0.000
0.323
0.942

1100

550

500

1100

550

550

Note: Table 7 reports the results of two-step (GMM) estimates using ZS and NPL as a proxy of bank risk taking
behavior. The p-values of the AR-2 correlation show that there is no issue of serial correlation in all models.
According to Hansen’s over-identification, all instruments are valid. P-values are mentioned in brackets below
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * presents significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

The results in Table 7 indicate that an increased growth rate in terms of
higher GDP results in decreasing overall risk taking behavior that helps in
achieving higher financial stability. The result implies that during times of economic growth, banks are in a better position to pay off their debts by increasing
the lending capacity, which helps them reduce their respective risk appetite.
This inverse relationship between GDP and bank risk taking behavior is likewise to the findings of (Yurdakul 2014). In terms of inflation, we find contrasting
results, for overall and emerging countries we find a positive association between
inflation and bank risk taking using ZS and NPL as measures of bank risk taking behavior. It implies that during an inflationary period, it is difficult for
banks to recover their bad debts because purchasing power parity decreases
that may hurt the stability of financial institutions. On the contrary, the results of developed countries revealed otherwise for both measures of bank risk
taking behavior. The inverse association between inflation and bank risk taking
behavior is similar to the findings presented by (Anginer et al 2018).

5 Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of board structure
and ownership structure on bank risk taking behavior in developed and emerging countries. To fulfill this objective, the study used annual data of 100 large
commercial banks for the period 2006-2017 from twelve countries. Zscore is used
as the main proxy of bank risk taking behavior. After controlling the problem
of endogeneity by using two-step (GMM) econometric approach, we found that
banks with a greater board size, higher portion of independent nonexecutive
directors, and a powerful CEO with chair role duality decreases the risk of
bankruptcy, which, in turn helps in achieving greater levels of financial stability
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in the banking sector. However, banks with an increased number of females on
board, higher foreign and state ownership escalate the risk taking behavior of
banks that may increase the chances of insolvency.
The findings of this study have several important policy implications. Based
on the results of study, we recommend that policymakers should encourage and
facilitate the inclusion of independent non-executive directors/outside directors
on bank boards as under reputational and employment hypothesis, they restrict banks to take excessive risks. This may help in balancing the interest of
shareholders and management on one hand while on the other hand, it may
result in increased stability of the banking institutions. Furthermore, we call on
regulators to reconsider the recent bill passed by the European parliament to
increase the board gender quota to at least 40 percent in large organizations as
our results suggest that women are not risk-averse. In addition, we recommend
policymakers to make such policies that eliminate the barriers for foreign-owned
banks in the host country. This is because foreign-owned enterprises bring foreign direct investment (FDI) and employment opportunities that may result in
rapid economic growth in the host country. Lastly, we call on stakeholders to
make such rules and regulations that restrict state owned banks to pursue risky
investments even when they are backed by their respective governments.
Lastly, the study comes up with several limitations. First, due to the unavailability of historical data we are unable to confirm our baseline results with
alternate default risk measures such as bond credit spreads, loan spreads, and
bond recovery rates. Likewise, other board structure characteristics such as directors compensation, education, political connections, and key shareholdings
in other companies are not covered in this study. However, these avenues are
left for future research along with the inclusion of different variables that may
differentiate corporate governance models and bank risk taking behavior in developed and emerging markets. Future studies may also investigate the role of
corporate governance in relation to bank risk taking after the onset of GFC and
ESDS.
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S.No

Country

Bank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

France
France
France
Germany
Germany
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

BNP Paribas
Credit Agricole
Societe Generale
Commerzbank AG
Deutsche Bank
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
Banca Popolare di Milano
Banca Popolare di Sondrio
Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia
Credito Valtellinese
Mediobanca
UNICREDIT
Unione di Banche Italiane
Banco Popular
BANCO SANTANDER
BANKINTER
BBVA SA (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria)
Barclays Bank
Bradford & Bingley plc
Close Brothers Group
HSBC Holdings
Lloyds Banking Group
Royal Bank of Scotland
Standard Chartered UK
East West Bancorp, Inc.
Associated Banc-Corp
Bank of America
BB&T Corp
Citigroup Inc.
Comerica Inc.
Cullen-Frost Bankers Inc
F.N.B. Corp. (PA) (FNB Corp.)
Fifth Third Bancorp
First Horizon National Corp.
Hancock Holding Co
Huntington Bancshares
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
KEYCORP INC
M&T BANK CORP
New York Community Bancorp Inc
PNC Financial Services Group.
Regions Financial Corp.
SunTrust Banks Inc.
Synovus Financial Corp
Texas Capital Bancshares
U.S. Bancorp
UMPQUA Holdings Crop
Valley National Bancrop
Wells & Fargo & Co.
Zions Bancorporation
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A2 Sample Distribution from Emerging Economies
S.No

Country

Bank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Thailand

Bank of China Limited
Bank of Communications Co Ltd
Bank of Ningbo Co.
China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited
China Construction Bank
China Everbright Bank
China Merchant’s Bank Co.
China MinSheng Banking Corporation
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank Co Ltd
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Ping An Bank Co Ltd
Shanghaipudong Development Bank
Axis Bank
Bank of India
Bankbaroda
Canara Bank Ltd.
HDFC BANK
ICICI Bank
IndusInd Bank
State Bank of India
Bank Central Asia
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk PT
Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
Bank Rakyat Indonesia
Alliance Investment Bank
AM BANK
CIMB Group
Hong Leong Bank Berhad
Malayan Banking Berhad
Public Bank
Allied Bank Limited
Askari LTD
Bank AL Falah
Bank AL Habib
Bank of Punjab
Faysal Bank
Habib Bank Limited
Habib Metropolitan Bank
Muslim Commercial Bank
National Bank of Pakistan
Soneri Bank
Standard Charter Pakistan
United Bank Limited
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited
Bank of Ayudhya Public Company Limited
Kasikornbank
Krung Thai Bank
The Siam Commercial Bank
TISCO Financial Group Public Company Limited
TMB Bank Public Company Limited
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